Protecting Popular Constituent Power: Examining New Zealand's Role in the Constitution-Making Episodes of the Cook Islands and Niue by Mead, Sarah
  577 
PROTECTING POPULAR CONSTITUENT 
POWER: EXAMINING NEW ZEALAND'S 
ROLE IN THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
EPISODES OF THE COOK ISLANDS AND 
NIUE 
Sarah Mead 
This article assesses the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes that brought 
into being the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand's role in the decolonisation 
of its former colonies has generally been seen as quite benign. New Zealand's status as an external 
actor, however, raises questions regarding the effect its influence had on the democratic legitimacy 
of the respective constitution-making processes.   
Constituent power theory demands that a constitution is the product of the popular political will; an 
act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the people. This article argues that the 
existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is not necessarily at odds with 
this. In so far as external actors do not displace the people's constituent power but rather enhance 
it, there is no reason to exclude such influence; there may even be reason to encourage it.  
By drawing on New Zealand's experience in decolonisation, this article ultimately advances a two-
stage model for constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-governing island 
states. As ongoing political ties with an external state are often sought, the aim of the model is to 
provide an avenue for that external state to participate in or contribute to the constitution-making 
process while maintaining the process's democratic legitimacy. 
  
  BA/LLB(Hons). This (revised) article was submitted in fulfilment of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria 
University of Wellington. The author wishes to thank Joel Colón-Ríos and Professor Tony Angelo for their 
support and guidance in writing this article.   
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I INTRODUCTION 
During the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of constitution-making washed across the Pacific region as 
several of the world's remaining colonised territories welcomed in a new era of independence in 
some form. Two such countries were the Cook Islands and Niue which, in 1965 and 1974 
respectively, became self-governing states in free association with New Zealand. In both cases, this 
significant political shift was accompanied by the coming into force of national constitutions. 
This article will explore the processes that brought into being the Constitutions of the Cook 
Islands and Niue. At decolonisation, both states rejected full independence and explicitly sought 
ongoing political ties with New Zealand as a condition to their advancement towards self-
government. As a result, New Zealand recognised a role for itself in the constitution-making 
processes and exerted significant influence throughout. Though New Zealand's role in this regard 
has generally been seen as quite benign, its status as an external actor raises questions regarding the 
effect its influence had on the democratic legitimacy of the resulting constitutional regimes.   
Classical constitutional theory locates constituent power – that is, the power to frame a 
constitution – in the people or the nation. By making those who will be bound by the constitution 
the source of its authority, the democratic legitimacy of the constitution is ensured. A 
democratically legitimate constitution is one that the people "give to themselves". For some states, 
the implicit exclusion of external actors in this classical notion of constituent power is 
unproblematic – constitution-making will proceed as an exclusively national exercise with nominal 
regard for external actors or states. For small dependent states such as the Cook Islands and Niue 
however, external actors simply cannot be ignored in the constitution-making process. For these 
states, the importance of their ties with an external state require recognition; their fragile political, 
economic and social realities demand a more flexible and responsive conception of constituent 
power.  
This article aims to assess the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes 
behind the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue, taking account of New Zealand's role. While 
this article accepts that the processes may have lacked democratic legitimacy, it will challenge the 
assumption behind classical constituent power theory that this is the inevitable result of New 
Zealand's influence. A strict conceptualisation of constituent power fundamentally limits the 
analysis of constitution-making and fails to recognise the potential for external influence to enhance 
the people's role in this process.  
With a view to establishing a more nuanced (and helpful) approach to assessing the effect of 
external influence, this article will explore the possibility of reconciling the theory of constituent 
power with the reality of external influence in constitution-making. Ultimately it will argue that 
reconciliation is possible, but that external influence must be carefully managed to maintain the 
democratic legitimacy of the process. An analytical framework aimed at identifying democratically 
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legitimate external intervention in the constitution-making process will be advanced, and it is on this 
basis that the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue will be assessed. 
Though critiquing New Zealand's role in the decolonisation process of its former colonies is a 
key component of this article, it is by no means the primary aim. In 2010, the United Nation's 
General Assembly declared 2011–2020 the Third International Decade for the Eradication of 
Colonialism.1 Despite the best efforts of the United Nations and the Committee of 24 (Special 
Committee on Decolonization), there remain 15 non-self-governing island states.2 Though these 
island states do not appear to be getting closer to completing the decolonisation process,3 in the 
instance that they do, it is likely that this will be on the condition that political ties with the colonial 
power will continue into the future.4 For constitution-making, this presents a challenge. By seeking 
ongoing ties with an external state, careful attention must be paid to ensure that the constitution is 
the product of a popular exercise of constituent power.  Towards addressing this challenge, this 
article will explore how constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-governing 
island states can include a role for an external power, while maintaining the process's democratic 
legitimacy.  
This article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the case studies, the Cook Islands and Niue, 
and gives some background to their respective constitution-making processes. Part III then 
establishes the article's theoretical compass points. The key concept of popular constituent power is 
introduced and an account of the procedurally normative conception of democratic legitimacy is 
advanced. In Part IV, classical and contemporary conceptions of constituent power in constitutional 
theory are considered with regards to the constitution-making episodes of the Cook Islands and 
Niue. In light of the difficulties presented by these conceptions, the article goes on to advance a 
  
1  Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 65/119, A/Res/ 65/119 (2011). The 
first international decade was proclaimed by International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA 
Res 43/47, A/Res/43/47 (1988). The second international decade was proclaimed by Second International 
Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 55/146, A/Res/55/146 (2000). 
2  The remaining non-self-governing island states are: American Samoa, Guam, Pitcairn, Tokelau, Anguilla, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, US Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 
Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos, St Helena, French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Gibraltar and Western 
Sahara are also non-self-governing territories, but are excluded from the scope of this article, the focus of 
which is island states. See United Nations "United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories" 
<http://www.un.org>. 
3  Perhaps with the exception of New Caledonia. Under the 1998 Noumea Accord, a referendum will be held 
between 2014 and 2019 to decide the future status of the territory. See Nic MacLellan "The Noumea Accord 
and Decolonisation in New Caledonia" (1999) 34 The Journal of Pacific History 245. With regards to the 
Falkland Islands, decolonisation is hampered by a territorial dispute. 
4  Since 1984, the only small territories to struggle and obtain full independence have been East Timor, 
Montenegro and Kosovo. See Godfrey Baldacchino "'Upside Down Decolonization' in Subnational Island 
Jurisdictions: Questioning the 'Post' in Postcolonialism" (2010) 13 Space and Culture 188 at 192. 
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more flexible conception of constituent power, which is considered more appropriate to assess the 
effect of external influence on the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process. In Part 
V, the constitutional experiences in the Cook Islands and Niue are analysed according to this more 
flexible conception.  Building on the conclusions from this analysis and looking towards the future, 
the final part of this article proposes a model of constitution-making that is considered more 
appropriate for dependent non-self-governing island states wishing to undergo constitutional change 
while retaining ties with an external state.   
II CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE COOK ISLANDS AND 
NIUE 
A Background 
The Cook Islands and Niue are two island states located in the South Pacific Ocean. By 
proclamation dated 10 June 1901 both were formally included within the boundaries of the "Colony 
of New Zealand".5 Though the Cook Islands and Niue accepted a shift towards self-government 
(with varying degrees of enthusiasm), it was New Zealand, not the colonies, which pushed for the 
latter to become self-governing following pressure from the United Nations (UN).6   
In 1960, New Zealand signed the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (the Declaration). The Declaration recognised that "all peoples have the right 
to … freely determine their political status",7 and was based on an assumption that full 
independence, if given the option, would be the desired option of the world's remaining colonies. It 
stated that:8 
[I]mmediate steps shall be taken, in United Nations Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all 
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those 
territories. 
The Declaration left colonial powers little room to manoeuvre, stating that "inadequacy of political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying 
independence".9  
Having signed the Declaration, New Zealand felt an acute sense of pressure to comply with its 
terms as soon as possible.10 The local people of the Cook Islands and Niue did not however, as 
  
5  Cook Islands Boundaries and Inclusion in New Zealand Proclamation 1901.  
6  Baldacchino, above n 4, at 190. 
7  Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples GA Res 1514, XV 
A/Res/1514 (1960), art 2. 
8  Article 5. 
9  Article 3.  
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suggested in the Declaration, display an apparent "yearning for freedom", nor was there any 
suggestion of a threat of "conflicts resulting from the denial" of their freedom.11 Rather, they 
explicitly demanded the maintenance of strong ties with New Zealand.  
To take account of this reality, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution later in 1960 
recognising alternative political arrangements (aside from full independence) that would afford the 
decolonising state the requisite full measure of self-government.12 On this basis, the New Zealand 
Minister of Island Territories presented a speech to the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (CILA) 
in 1962 (which was later sent to the Niue Island Assembly (NIA)), on the colonies' constitutional 
futures. The Assemblies were presented with four options: (1) full independence; (2) Polynesian 
federation; (3) integration with New Zealand; or (4) internal self-government.13 The Minister 
expressed the view "that it would be in the best interests of the Cook Islands [and Niuean] people to 
keep the present link with New Zealand, but to have full internal self-government".14 
In 1962, the CILA and NIA passed resolutions stating that internal self-government, rather than 
full independence, was their preference. Towards the attainment of that goal, the New Zealand 
Government prepared "a programme for the future", which included a timetable mapping out a 
careful transfer of power over the course of three years towards self-government.15 The Cook 
Islands went ahead with constitutional change loosely according to New Zealand's proposal. Niue, 
however, accepted internal self-government in principle, but demanded a more gradual approach. 
Pragmatic reasons ultimately informed the respective Assemblies' rejection of full 
independence. At the time of decolonisation, both countries had very small populations which 
persist today. Niue, with just one island and a land mass of 260 square kilometres, had a total 
  
10  Terry Chapman The Decolonisation of Niue (Victoria University Press and NZ Institute of International 
Affairs, Wellington, 1976) at 19.  
11  Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, above n 7. 
12  The resolution recognised three decolonisation options: "A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to 
have reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state; (b) 
Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State." Principles which 
should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called 
for under Article 73e of the Charter GA Res 1541, XV (1960). 
13  Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories "Future Political Development" (speech to Cook Islands 
Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962) as reported in The Proceedings of the Fifth Session of 
the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands (1962) at 101–108. 
14  At 105. 
15  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Future Political Development (Cook Islands Legislative Assembly 
Paper No 18, 1963) (presented by the President of the CILA "by direction of the Hon Minister of Island 
Territories"). 
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population of 4,000 people.16 The Cook Islands had a larger population of about 18,000 people,17 
but this population was spread throughout 15 islands scattered over approximately two million 
square kilometres of ocean. The small size, lack of natural resources and geographical isolation of 
these island states at decolonisation meant that economic development was severely limited. Owing 
to heavy subsidies from the New Zealand government along with remittances from family in New 
Zealand however, neither countries' living standards reflected this reality. When constitutional 
change was suggested in 1962 therefore, it is not surprising that the island states' future relationship 
with New Zealand was a key concern of the local people. 
B The Constitution-Making Processes 
1 The Cook Islands 
The constitution-making process in the Cook Islands was, by all accounts, rapid, taking effect a 
mere three years after constitutional change was first suggested by the New Zealand Government.18  
Addressing the CILA in 1962, the Minister of Island Territories made clear that, with regards to 
constitutional change, "the final decision will have to be made by the people of the Cook Islands".19 
The Minister cited a desire, however, to "cooperate with the United Nations",20 and a feeling on the 
part of the Government "not to postpone matters too long".21 Two days later, the CILA passed a 
resolution in favour of self-government.22 
After accepting the timetable towards self-government prepared by the New Zealand 
Government, the CILA requested expert assistance. Three advisers were chosen: Professor Aikman, 
Professor Davidson and Mr Wright.23 Following a visit of nine days, the three advisers prepared a 
report comprising 44 recommendations for constitutional change.24 The report stated that, as far as 
  
16  Niue Statistics "Population" <http://www.spc.int>. 
17  Statistics Office, Rarotonga, Cook Islands "Total Population and Land Area by Island" 
<http://www.spc.int>. 
18  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, sch 1. 
19  Gotz, above n 13, at 106. 
20  At 104. 
21  At 106. 
22  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Resolution of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (13 July 1962). 
23  Professor Aikman was Professor of Constitutional Law at Victoria University. Professor Davidson was 
Professor of Pacific History at Australia National University and had acted as adviser to the Government of 
Western Samoa preceding independence. Mr Wright had acted as High Commissioner for New Zealand in 
Western Samoa and Secretary of Island Territories. 
24  CC Aikman, JW Davidson and JB Wright "Report to the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook 
Islands on Constitutional Development" (1999) 30 VUWLR 519. 
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the advisers could judge, "the recommendations … for constitutional development are in full 
accordance with the wishes of the Cook Islands people, as expressed by ... their elected 
representatives".25 The CILA approved the recommendations in the report, with only minor 
modifications.26 The Constitution, which was drafted in New Zealand in collaboration with the 
advisers (in English only), was based on this report.  
After passing its first reading in the New Zealand Parliament, the proposed Constitution was 
sent to the Select Committee on Island Territories sitting in Wellington.27 Along with hearing 
submissions from Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand, the Committee welcomed a delegation 
of four CILA members.28  
On 17 November 1964, the Cook Islands Constitution Act was passed by the New Zealand 
Parliament. As stipulated in the Act, the Constitution was to come into force following the election 
of a new CILA.29 At the first meeting of the newly elected CILA, three resolutions were passed 
requesting that the New Zealand Parliament amend the Constitution.30 Having given effect to the 
requested amendments, self-government in the Cook Islands was proclaimed on 27 July 1965 to 
come into effect on 4 August 1965.31 
2 Niue 
The Constitution of Niue was the result of a much slower constitution-making process than that 
in the Cook Islands.32 Despite passing a resolution in 1962 accepting that self-government was best 
  
25  At 522. 
26  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper No 45 (1963). 
27  The Select Committee, established on 10 August 1964, met 11 times over period of a week, and recorded 
196 pages of typescript in the questioning of witnesses. The members included the Prime Minister, the 
Leader of the Opposition and Minister of Island Territories: Island Territories Committee Report of 
Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands 
Constitution Bill (23 September 1964). 
28  The delegation consisted of Hon D C Brown, Hon Makea Nui Teremoana Ariki, Hon David Hosking, Hon 
Naine Rere, and was accompanied by Mr Dare, the Resident Commissioner. Professor Aikman and Mr 
Wright were also in attendance. 
29  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s 1. The relevant election was held on 20 April 1965.  
30  The amendments included a change to the candidature rules for election to the CILA, a change to the 
number of Cabinet Ministers from five to seven, the establishment of a House of Arikis (to function as a 
consultative body), and changes to the role of the New Zealand High Commissioner to include acting as the 
representative of the Queen. See Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965 (passed on 7 June 1965). 
31  Cook Islands Constitution Act Commencement Order 1965. 
32  Niue Constitution Act 1974. 
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for Niue (and asking that the other three alternatives be "buried forever"),33 the NIA demanded a 
"piecemeal" approach to constitutional development.34  
After receiving the timetable prepared by the New Zealand Government outlining steps to 
attaining self-government, the NIA requested expert assistance in 1963. Two years later, the New 
Zealand Government sent Professor Aikman and Mr McEwen to Niue (after constitutional change 
had been effectively "dealt" with in the Cook Islands).35 Early on, it became apparent to the advisers 
that the short time frames proposed in the timetable had created "a great deal of concern".36 The 
advisers' first report therefore suggested that any formal constitutional developments in Niue be put 
on hold.37 
Four years later, the Assembly passed a motion to reconsider New Zealand's proposal for 
constitutional change. At this point, Professor Quentin-Baxter took over as constitutional adviser to 
the NIA.38 During discussions with the NIA, the Assembly made clear to Professor Quentin-Baxter 
that it was still "by no means committed to the view that there should be any further constitutional 
changes in the immediate future".39 After extensive local consultation (which predominantly 
confirmed the NIA's uncertain stance), Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended to the New Zealand 
Government that formal constitutional development again be put on hold.  
Developments in the early 1970s contributed to an increasing sense of confidence and positivity 
on the Island towards constitutional change. In June 1972, Niue received a UN Visiting Mission 
which led to the Select Committee on Constitutional Development (set up by the Niuean 
Government) taking action. After hearing submissions from the public, the Committee established a 
timetable towards self-government which was subsequently approved by the New Zealand 
Government and the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly. Recognising that 
constitutional development was no longer "paralysed by the people's deep anxiety" during his 
  
33  Niue Assembly Minutes from the Niue Island Assembly (23 August 1962) at 12[20].  
34  Chapman, above n 10, at 14. 
35  Professor Aikman had formerly advised the CILA on the Cook Islands Constitution (see above n 23). Mr 
McEwen was Secretary of Island Territories. 
36  CC Aikman and JM McEwan A Report to the Minister of Island Territories on the Constitutional 
Development of Niue (Department of Island Territories, 1965) at 2[5]. 
37  At 2[6]. 
38  RQ Quentin Baxter was a Professor of Law at Victoria University of Wellington. 
39  RQ Quentin-Baxter "Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue" 
[1971] AJHR A4 at 6[6]. 
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second visit in 1974,40 Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended that the constitution be prepared at 
the request of the NIA.  
The Constitution of Niue, drafted in New Zealand, was informed by Professor Quentin-Baxter's 
second report. After passing its first reading in the New Zealand Parliament, the Select Committee 
charged with receiving submissions on the proposed Constitution sat in both Wellington and Niue.41 
Following generally positive feedback, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Niue Constitution 
Act on 29 August 1974, to come into effect following an affirmative popular referendum. On 
September 3 1974, 65.4 per cent voted in favour of Niue's new constitutional arrangements, with 
34.6 per cent against.42 The Constitution entered into force by Proclamation on 19 October 1974.43   
C The Constitutions 
The Constitutions are Schedules to Acts of the New Zealand Parliament that were made part of 
the law of both New Zealand, and the Cook Islands and Niue respectively. The Acts conferred 
plenary powers on the respective governments of the Cook Islands and Niue. By passing these Acts, 
the New Zealand Parliament irrevocably removed its power to legislate for its former colonies, 
thereby establishing the Cook Islands and Niue as fully internally self-governing states. Though the 
New Zealand Parliament could amend the Acts by simple majority, such amendments would only 
have effect in New Zealand.44 Amendments made to the Constitution Acts by the CILA or NIA are 
not made to the respective New Zealand Acts. 
The Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue share, at least at a superficial level, many 
similarities. In both instances, what can be readily identified as the Constitution is contained in a 
Schedule to an Act of the New Zealand Parliament. The Constitutions provide for self-
government,45 while allowing for continued association with New Zealand under a common Head 
of State (the Queen in Right of the Realm of New Zealand),46 common New Zealand citizenship,47 
  
40  RQ Quentin-Baxter "Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of 
Niue" (1999) 30 VUWLR 577 at 580. 
41  Alison Quentin-Baxter "Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser" (2002) 33 
VUWLR 237 at 260. 
42  Voter turnout for the referendum was 97 per cent. See Report of the United Nations Special Mission to 
Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue XXII A/9623/Add 5 (1974). 
43  Niue Constitution Act Commencement Order 1974.  
44  The Constitution of Niue does leave open the possibility for the New Zealand Parliament to amend its 
Constitution with the NIA's request and consent (art 36), but this provision has not been used for several 
decades. The Cook Islands Constitution originally had a similar provision, but this was repealed in 1980 – 
thereby removing any ability for the New Zealand Parliament to legislate for the Cook Islands. 
45  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s 3; Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 3.  
46  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s 2; Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 1. See Letters Patent Constituting 
the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand (28 October 1983), SR 1983/225 (as amended SR 1987/8 
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and a continuing responsibility on the part of New Zealand for each states' external affairs and 
defence.48 The Constitutions further establish a parliamentary system of government, with 
responsibility for executive authority vested in a Cabinet of Ministers chosen from a fully elected 
Legislative Assembly and headed by the Premier.  
Owing to the island states' unique characteristics and constitution-making processes, there are of 
course several notable differences between the Constitutions. The most prominent for the purposes 
of this article relate to the ongoing relationship of the Cook Islands and Niue with New Zealand. 
The Niue Constitution Act includes a provision for ongoing "necessary economic and administrative 
assistance to Niue" from New Zealand,49 and regular consultation between the two governments.50  
The Cook Islands Constitution lacks any such provisions.  
III CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
A Democratic Legitimacy and Constituent Power 
This article defends a procedurally normative conception of democratic legitimacy in 
constitution-making, the criterion for which is the concept of popular constituent power.  
Constituent power, or constitution-making power, "is the political will, whose power or 
authority is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form of its 
own political existence".51 Writing during the French Revolution, Sieyès identified "the people" or 
"the nation" as the subjects of constituent power (le pouvoir constituant).52 In doing so, he heralded 
an important shift in constitutional theory. Where previously public power had relied on external 
sources of authority (ie religion) for legitimation, Sieyès demanded that the conscious willing of the 
people could provide that authority, stating that "[t]he national will … never needs anything but its 
own existence to be legal. It is the source of all legality."53 
Constitutional theory rests on an important distinction between constituent (constitution-
making) power and constituted (law-making) power. Constituted power (which includes executive, 
  
and SR 2006/224). See generally Laws of New Zealand "Pacific States and Territories: Cook Islands" 
(online ed) at [29]; and Elisabeth Perham "Citizenship laws in the Realm of New Zealand" (2011) 9 NZYIL 
219.  
47  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s 6; Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 5. 
48  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s 5; Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 6. 
49  Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 7. 
50  Section 8. 
51  Carl Schmitt Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, Durham, 2007) at 125. 
52  Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès What is the Third Estate? (Pall Mall Press, London, 1963) at 58.  
53  At 126. 
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legislative and judicial authority) remains permanently subordinate to constituent power, which 
conversely can never be constrained nor exhausted. As explained by Schmitt:54  
All constitutionally constituted powers and competencies are based on the constitution-making power. 
However it can never constitute itself in terms of constitutional law. The people, the nation, remains the 
origin of all political action, the source of all power… 
The connection between constituent power and democracy can be readily identified. Democracy 
requires that all eligible citizens participate equally in the creation of the laws to which they are 
subject. The theory of constituent power demands that the constitution, the fundamental law of 
society, is the product of the political will of the people (those who will be subject to the 
constitution). By permanently locating the constitution-making power in those who are bound by the 
constitution, the theory of constituent power effectively guarantees the democratic nature of the 
constitutional regime. "Constituent politics", Kalyvas explains, "might be seen as the explicit, lucid 
self-institution of society, whereby the citizens are jointly called to be the authors of their 
constitutional identity and to decide the central rules and higher procedures that will regulate their 
political and social life".55  
There is sound reason to be concerned with democracy at the level of constitution-making. As 
Colón-Ríos explains, "if there is a deficit of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws, the 
democratic legitimacy of the constitutional regime is inevitably put into question".56 Recognition of 
the importance of democratic process in relation to the creation of ordinary laws thus necessarily 
requires that attention be paid to how the relevant fundamental law was created.  
Democratic legitimacy in constitution-making is therefore understood in this article as meaning 
the extent to which a constitution can be seen as the manifestation of the political will of the people 
it purports to bind – or in other words, the manifestation of an exercise of popular constituent 
power.57   
  
54  Schmitt, above n 51, at 128 (emphasis added). 
55  Andreas Kalyvas "Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power" (2005) 12(5) 
Constellations 223 at 237. 
56  Joel Colón-Ríos "The Second Dimension of Democracy: The People and Their Constitution" (2009) 2(2) 
Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 1 at 9. 
57  The scope of this article is limited to those instances of constitution-making where "the people" is an 
already recognised entity (so it would not realistically apply to the Falkland Islands). Popular constituent 
power as a criterion for assessing democratic constitution-making presupposes a people or a nation. Where 
this is not already established (for example, where a state's borders are disputed), this criterion is of limited 
utility as it is difficult to identify "a people" who are to give to themselves a constitution. The problem of 
"democratic beginnings" arises. See generally Hans Agné "Democratic founding: We the people and the 
others" (2012) 10 Int J Const L 836; and Zoran Oklopcic "Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, 
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Popular constituent power "represents an ideal and pure type of democratic constitutional 
making".58 Constitution-making however rarely occurs in ideal "textbook" conditions.59 Reality 
thus demands that democratic legitimacy in constitution-making be treated as a matter of degree. 
For a constitution to enjoy democratic legitimacy, however, at a minimum the people must be 
responsible for defining its fundamental elements.60 In this regard, Schmitt identifies certain 
"fundamental political decisions" that form the basis of a constitution.61 Referencing the Weimar 
Constitution, Schmitt identifies those decisions pertaining to whether Germany would be a republic 
or a monarchy, a federal or unitary system, or a parliamentary or presidential system, as 
fundamental to the resulting constitutional regime. These decisions define the "people's form of 
political existence and thus constitute the fundamental prerequisites for all subsequent norms".62  
IV EXTERNAL INFLUENCE AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY  
Strictly understood, constituent power theory dictates that, as outsiders will not be bound by the 
resulting constitutional regime, their involvement detracts from the process's democratic legitimacy. 
A strict conception of popular constituent power is dominant in classical constitutional theory. 
Sieyès, the father of constituent power theory, implicitly excludes a role for outsiders in the 
constitution-making process by identifying the "nation" as the exclusive source of constituent 
power. As explained by Schmitt, in a democracy, "[t]he people are the bearer of the constitution-
making power and, as such, grant themselves their constitution".63 As explained by Agné, "the 
critical, though not always explicit, assumption in this literature is that only those can exercise 
legitimate constituent powers who will become citizens in the future state".64  
On a strict conception of popular constituent power, it is clear that, given New Zealand's 
involvement, the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue would be considered (to varying 
  
New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans" (2012) 19(1) 
Constellations 81. 
58  Kalyvas, above n 55, at 238. 
59  See Jon Elster "Forces and Mechanisms in Constitution-Making" (1995) 45 Duke LJ 123 at 138. 
60  The focus of this article is democracy at the level of constitution-making. However, while democracy at the 
level of constitution-making (which may extend to amendments to the constitution's fundamental elements) 
is required for a constitution to enjoy democratic legitimacy, it will not determine the overall democratic 
legitimacy of a constitution. It is entirely possible for the constitution-making process to be highly 
democratic, and for the people to choose a substantively undemocratic constitution.  
61  Schmitt, above n 51, at 78. 
62  At 78.  
63  At 225. 
64  Hans Agné "Democratic founding: We the people and the Others" (2012) 10 Int J Const L 836 at 852 
(emphasis added). 
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degrees) the products of processes lacking in democratic legitimacy. This conclusion may be fair; 
there is much to criticise in relation to the constitution-making processes in the Cook Islands and 
Niue. To base this conclusion simply on the existence of external influence in the constitution-
making process is, however, problematic.  
At decolonisation, the Cook Islands and Niue attached "the highest importance" to the 
maintenance of their association with New Zealand.65 They explicitly sought to retain New Zealand 
citizenship and assurances that they would continue receiving economic and administrative 
assistance. A role for New Zealand was therefore to be expected in the constitution-making episodes 
of the Cook Islands and Niue because of the ongoing political relationship sought.  
The involvement of New Zealand in the constitution-making processes of Cook Islands and 
Niue could be disregarded today as something from a bygone era; as examples of the final gasps of 
colonisation before the world entered a more enlightened age where such intervention is considered 
simply inappropriate. On such a view, the existence of external influence in these processes would 
not be seen as challenging the applicability of a strict conception of popular constituent power. If 
anything, the case studies would be treated as affirming the normative value of a strict conception as 
a conclusion that the processes lacked democratic legitimacy would accord with a sense that 
something was amiss in these cases.  
A cursory glance over the extent of external influence in modern constitution-making, however, 
warns against any hasty conclusions to that effect. The orientation of "constitutional civility",66 
which informed the processes in the Cook Islands and Niue, takes a new form today as "democracy 
promotion", "peace building" or "transitional justice". Recent constitution-making episodes, such as 
those in Iraq,67 Bosnia-Herzegovina,68 East Timor and Sudan,69 reveal the extent to which external 
  
65  Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 24, at 521[5]; similarly expressed by Quentin-Baxter regarding 
Niue. He notes that "the most important question for Niue will always be its relationship with New 
Zealand": see Quentin-Baxter, above n 40, at 578. 
66  "Constitutional civility" is a constitutional orientation that often informed the creation of 
decolonisation/independence constitutions. A constitution is treated by a departing colonial power as a 
means of establishing modern state institutions in their image in the colony: see Sara Kendall 
"'Constitutional Technicity': Displacing Politics through Expert Knowledge" [2013] Law, Culture and the 
Humanities 1 at 2.  
67  See Noah Feldman "Imposed Constitutionalism" (2005) 37 Conn L Rev 857; Andrew Arato Constitution-
making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq (Colombia University Press, New 
York, 2009); and Philipp Dann and Zaid Al'Ali "The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution-
Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor" (2006) 10 Max Planck UNYB 423. 
68  See Zoran Oklopcic "After the People: The Demise of Self-Determination, A New Constitutional Theory 
and Tradeoffs of Peoplehood" (Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, University of 
Toronto, 2008); and Zoran Oklopcic "Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent 
Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans" (2012) 19(1) Constellations 81. 
69  See Dann and Al'Ali, above n 67. 
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actors are often involved in the process. Be it through the offering of expert advice or through the 
determination of the constitution's procedural or substantive framework, external actors consistently 
have a part to play in modern constitution-making. This has led Dann and Al'Ali to suggest the 
emergence of an "internationalised pouvoir constituant".70 As explained by Preuss, no longer can 
state constitutions be considered (if they ever could) as "purely domestic instruments of government 
of a nation-bound population which exercises its right to national self-determination without 
concern of its regional or global surroundings".71  
To accept a classical (strict) understanding of popular constituent power, therefore, requires 
accepting that not only the case studies, but also many examples of modern constitution-making, fall 
outside the analytical ambit of constitutional theory. A failure to operate as an analytical tool in 
reality risks rendering constitutional theory irrelevant, and thus a strict conception of constituent 
power must be rejected.  
A Enlarged (Loose) Conception of Constituent Power 
Recognising the gap between constitutional theory and the realities of constitution-making, 
Oklopcic has advanced an argument in favour of "enlarging" constituent power beyond the people to 
reflect the "multiplicity of constituent powers, not only from within, but also from without".72  
Following an analysis of external actors in the constitutional experiences of the Balkan states, 
Oklopcic posits that the number of constituent powers involved in a constitution-making episode 
must be pluralised and enlarged beyond the people. Drawing on Loughlin's concept of political 
prudence,73 Oklopcic argues that enlarging the notion of constituent power to include external 
actors would amount to a necessary "prudential attunement" of theory with reality. A re-imagining 
of constituent power would involve perceiving the constituent not as just the people, but as "an 
assemblage of political powers".74 The fundamental link between the people and constituent power 
would thus be severed.   
Such an "attunement" finds support in the sociological approach to understanding constituent 
power advanced by Thornhill.75 Through his analysis of the theory of constituent power in the 
  
70  At 423. 
71  Ulrich K Preuss "Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through 
External Constitutionalization" (2006-2007) 51 NYL Sch L Rev 467 at 490. 
72  Oklopcic "Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of 
Constitutional Orders in the Balkans", above n 68, at 97. 
73  See Martin Loughlin The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004). 
74  Oklopcic "Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of 
Constitutional Orders in the Balkans", above n 68, at 81. 
75  Chris Thornhill "Contemporary constitutionalism and the dialectic of constituent power" (2012) 1 GlobCon 
369. 
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context of a perceived emergent transnational constitution, Thornhill argues that a literalistic 
understanding of the relation between political concepts and the political system must be abandoned 
to make way for a more sociologically adaptive approach. By linking classical (strict) conceptions 
of constituent power to a political need in the 18th century to produce constitutional legitimacy 
without reliance on external principles or social attachments, Thornhill explains why the concept 
was necessarily limited to the people and why, in view of the "post-state transnational order", it need 
not necessarily remain so.  
Constituent power is a political concept that ought to be capable of evolution to reflect political 
reality; fossilising the concept risks rendering it relevant only to academics. There is however a real 
risk that the normative value of popular constituent power will be hollowed out if expanded beyond 
the people. Oklopcic recognises that enlarging constituent power involves "an obvious and 
unarticulated tradeoff".76 He explains:77 
What we acquire in our prudential attunement to the realities of external constituent influence, we lose 
on the side of normative and rhetorical benefits stemming from the vocabulary of constituent power of 
the sovereign people.  
He argues however that a recalibration of theory with reality should not be frustrated by normative 
concerns, asserting that "there is no reason why constitutional theory should be invested in a 
particular normative programme".78 Contrary to this claim, there appears to be very good reasons 
for constitutional theory to be invested in some form of normative programme. 
By directly connecting the citizen to the constitution, popular constituent power provides a 
powerful rhetoric in support of a participative and active citizenry committed to constitutional 
enforcement. Violations of the constitution are more likely to be challenged, rendering the 
constitution more effective.79 As it always remains with the people, popular constituent power can 
act as a constant reminder to national leaders that they, and the pouvoir constitué in general, 
ultimately remain subject to the will of the people. At the international level, recognition that the 
people, the nation, are the only holders of constituent power sends a strong message to powerful 
states to exercise restraint before considering intervening in the constitution-making episodes of 
foreign countries.80 
  
76  Oklopcic "Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of 
Constitutional Orders in the Balkans", above n 68, at 97. 
77  At 97. 
78  At 93. 
79  Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?" 
(2009) 5 Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 201 at 216. 
80  Oklopcic "Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of 
Constitutional Orders in the Balkans", above n 68, at 89. 
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There is a need to accept and account for the fact that external actors can strongly influence the 
constitution-making process. To fail to do so leaves open the potential for abuse and risks rendering 
constitutional literature irrelevant. By weakening the link between constituent power and the people 
however, academics such as Oklopcic ultimately go too far. To retain the valuable normative 
benefits of popular constituent power, it must remain in the hands of the people who will be bound 
by the resulting constitutional regime.  
B A Flexible Conception of Constituent Power: Towards a New 
Analytical Framework 
In order to recognise and make space for external actors in the constitution-making process 
while retaining the normative benefits of popular constituent power, a strict exclusionary conception 
of popular constituent power and a loose conception that severs the link between constituent power 
and the people must be rejected. A democratically legitimate constitutional regime requires that the 
people subject to that regime co-institute it. There is nothing implicit in this requirement however, 
that demands the exclusion of external actors. Recognising a role for external actors in constitution-
making does not require departing from the fundamentals of constitutional theory. It does however 
require a more nuanced understanding of how constituent power is exercised.  
The traditional theory of constituent power implicitly excludes external influence in the 
constitution-making process because it is seen as displacing a popular (or internal) exercise of 
constituent power. Where external influence is not carefully managed such a displacement will 
likely occur, but this will not necessarily be the case. The people's capacity to exercise constituent 
power is not decreased simply because an external actor has influenced the constitution-making 
process; the existence of one is not necessarily at the expense of the other. Agné explains:81 
That actor A affects actor B does not by itself mean that there are fewer or less important possibilities of 
action available to B, nor that B is prevented from performing any particular action. The effect caused 
by A may indeed have been to increase B's possibilities to act freely. 
Rather than falling back on generalised verdicts, analysing the democratic legitimacy of external 
influence in constitution-making requires a particularised assessment. The focus needs to be on the 
effect the relevant external actor/state had on the exercise of popular constituent power. To aid in 
this assessment, a distinction needs to be made between cases of external exercise of and external 
influence on constituent power. If the intervention of an external actor amounts to an exercise of 
constituent power, the democratic legitimacy of the process will be compromised. If, however, an 
external actor simply influences a popular exercise of constituent power, the process's democratic 
legitimacy will be unharmed and may even be enhanced.   
  
81  Agné, above n 64, at 858. 
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There is no clear point at which external influence becomes an external exercise of constituent 
power. The complexity of constitution-making means that it is more likely to fall somewhere along 
a spectrum.82 Dann and Al'Ali identify three categories of external influence along this spectrum: 
marginal, partial and total. "Marginal influence" occurs when an external actor is involved but 
control over the process and substance remains in the hands of the people (for example, when a state 
seeks constitutional advice). In such instances, the popular constituent power could easily be 
recognised as having been influenced. Conversely, "total influence" occurs when an external actor 
takes control of the constitution-making process to such a degree that the people's constituent power 
is completely displaced. In such cases, the effect is a clear external exercise of constituent power – 
or imposition. In the grey area between these poles is the "partial influence" of constituent power. In 
such cases, "the pouvoir constituant is neither entirely surrendered nor is it kept entirely intact. 
Instead, control over the constitutional process is shared".83 In these cases, it becomes less clear 
whether constituent power is exercised by an external actor or power, or simply influenced.  
Adopting a more nuanced understanding of constituent power raises a fresh series of critical 
questions. To identify when external influence becomes an external exercise of constituent power, it 
is necessary to have some idea of what actually counts as an exercise of constituent power. There is 
a need to ask: what aspects of the process must be in the hands of the people to allow a conclusion 
that there was an exercise of popular constituent power? Or as questioned by Preuss: "what 
conditions must be fulfilled in order that it is 'the people' which we can recognise as the true author 
of the constitution and consequently, the source of its normative validity"?84 
It is helpful at this stage to return to Schmitt's concept of the "fundamental political decisions" 
of a constitution. For Schmitt:85 
The political decision reached regarding the type and form of state existence, which constitutes the 
substance of the constitution, is valid … because the subject of the constitution-making power 
determines the type and form of this existence.  
Because in a democracy the subject of the constitution-making power is the people, it is they 
who must determine the fundamental political decisions of their constitution for it to be 
democratically legitimate. A popular exercise of constituent power requires that the people 
determine the fundamental political decisions. In cases where an external actor determines one or 
several such decisions, an external exercise of constituent power can be said to have occurred.  
  
82  Dann and Al-Ali, above n 67, at 428. 
83  At 430. 
84  Ulrich Preuss "The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe" in Martin Loughlin and 
Neil Walker The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 211 at 212. 
85  Schmitt, above n 51, at 136. 
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Difficulty may arise, however, when determining who ultimately determined a constitution's 
fundamental political decisions. To assist in this regard, the literature on constitution-making 
identifies certain procedures and mechanisms that are seen as necessary for the constitution to be 
considered a product of a popular exercise of constituent power (ie democratically legitimate).86 
Though academic views diverge as to the finer details, there is general consensus that democratic 
constitution-making requires a desire "from below" to undergo constitutional change,87 open and 
participative constitutional deliberations led by an elected constitution-making body, and ratification 
by the people (state citizens) of the final proposed constitution. Where these procedures are 
followed, it becomes possible to conclude that the fundamental political decisions encapsulated in 
the final constitution reflect the political will of the people. Conversely, their absence leaves open 
the possibility of an external exercise of constituent power.  
If it is found that external influence did not amount to an exercise of constituent power but 
rather just an influence, the effect this influence had on the process overall still requires attention.  
Given that constitution-making ought to be a national exercise (and the risks associated with 
external actors exercising constituent power), unless external influence enhances a popular exercise 
of constituent power it ought to be discouraged.  
Agné explains how external intervention in constitution-making can "enhance internal abilities". 
By defining autonomy as the "capacity of individuals to reflect on, and to choose among, alternative 
and widely different courses of action in their individual as well as collective life",88 Agné argues 
that an external actor enhances their constituent power by contributing to the range of constitutional 
alternatives available to the people.89 Take for example the external adviser who offers alternative 
political models that accord with the people's desired political order. The adviser's input can be seen 
as having enhanced the people's autonomy by making available to them a greater range of 
constitutional options they may not otherwise have considered. In turn, the people are better able to 
contribute to the making of the constitution's fundamental political decisions, and thus to exercise 
their constituent power.  
Finally, an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of the constitution should not be limited to 
the initial constitution-making episode. Even under a constitution initially created by an external 
exercise of constituent power, a people could reclaim its constituent power by amending the 
  
86  See generally Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount, above n 79; Andrew Arato "Forms of Constitution-making and 
Theories of Democracy" (1995) 17 Cardozo L Rev 191; Joel Colón-Ríos "Notes on Democracy and 
Constitution-Making" (2011) 9 NZJPIL 17; Elster, above n 59; and Jonathan Wheatley and Fernando 
Mendez (eds) Patterns of Constitutional Design: The Role of Citizens and Elites in Constiution-Making 
(Ashgate Publishing, England, 2013). 
87  Colón-Ríos, above n 86, at 36. 
88  Agné, above n 64, at 856. 
89  At 860. 
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constitution (or by deciding not to amend it while having the power to do so). An analysis of 
democratic legitimacy in constitution-making should therefore extend to whether the people have 
subsequently "become authors of their constitution, even if they were not so when the constitution 
was originally created".90 This is based on the understanding that the "constitution-making power is 
not thereby expended and eliminated, because it was exercised once".91  
There are several benefits to accepting a more nuanced conception of popular constituent power 
that underpins the analytical framework advanced above. There is the obvious advantage that it is 
more responsive to reality. By recognising that external influence is not necessarily democratically 
attenuating, a more insightful analysis of the external influence and the effect that it had on the 
process becomes possible. It further allows for recognition of the value that can be added to the 
constitution-making process by involving outsiders.  
There are, however, negatives associated with rejecting a strict conception of popular 
constituent power. By maintaining that constituent power must be exercised by the people to be 
democratically legitimate, the approach is more restrictive than that advanced by the likes of 
Oklopcic. In fact, it is true that on this approach it is likely that most external interventions will be 
considered damaging to the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process. This simply 
reflects the reality that democracy requires that people ought to have the power to determine the 
constitutional regime under which they live.   
A more compelling critique is that a flexible conception introduces ambiguity to the role of 
external actors in the constitution-making process. A clear-cut approach like that provided for by a 
strict conception of popular constituent power makes it easier to identify inappropriate 
(democratically damaging) input (ie any external influence). The practical consequence of such an 
approach is that it sends a stronger message to outsiders not to get involved in what should be a 
national and citizen-driven exercise. Though this is a valid concern, strict rules are incompatible 
with the fundamentally political exercise that is constitution-making.  
V ANALYSING THE CASE STUDIES 
Based on the discussion in the preceding section, the analytical framework on which the case 
studies will be assessed involves asking two key questions in the alternative. First, were the people 
of the Cook Islands and Niue responsible for the fundamental political decisions in the respective 
constitution-making processes? If so, did New Zealand's role in the processes enhance the people's 
capacity to make those decisions, and thus their constituent power? If not, have the people 
subsequently reclaimed their constituent power? 
  
90  Joel Colón-Ríos "The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits of 
Constitutional Reform" (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 199 at 201. 
91  Schmitt, above n 51, at 125. 
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The circumstances surrounding the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue 
raise issues of partial influence. New Zealand did not unilaterally write the respective Constitutions, 
nor did it remain completely absent from the processes. It did however recognise a role for itself in 
the constitution-making process of its colonies. Alison Quentin-Baxter, assistant to the NIA's 
constitutional adviser, explains:92  
As administering authority, the New Zealand Government saw itself as having a responsibility and a 
right to contribute to the decision-making. The people of Niue wished to remain New Zealand citizens, 
and were seeking a relationship of free association with New Zealand. As a term of this relationship, 
New Zealand would have a continuing responsibility to provide necessary economic and administrative 
assistance to Niue. 
Because of the dependent nature of the relationship and the ongoing political ties sought, there was 
considerable scope for New Zealand to wield significant influence, directly or indirectly, over the 
constitutional deliberations of the Cook Islands and Niue.   
To ascertain what effect New Zealand did have, it is necessary to return to the constitution-
making processes in the Cook Islands and Niue.  
A Cook Islands 
The Cook Islands was generally enthusiastic about the prospect of self-government. There was 
certainly concern regarding what self-government meant for the state's future relationship with New 
Zealand. However, following assurances that assistance would continue, the people embraced 
constitutional change much more readily than Niue. Somewhat paradoxically, this resulted in the 
people of the Cook Islands having less control over the constitution-making process and its 
corresponding fundamental political decisions. The substantive and procedural limitations placed on 
the constitutional deliberations by accepting the New Zealand Government's timetable for self-
government, coupled with lack of public participation throughout, led to outsiders being able to take 
the lead in the process and to ultimately determine key fundamental political decisions. 
Having instigated the constitution-making process in the Cook Islands, New Zealand proceeded 
to exert significant influence throughout the process by providing what became the framework for 
constitutional development and deliberations. After the CILA passed a resolution requesting "that 
the New Zealand Government proceed with its plan for giving the Cook Islands the fullest (possible 
degree of) internal self-government",93 New Zealand prepared a timetable "for future political 
development".94 The timetable set out steps for a gradual handover of power, accounting for a 
  
92  Quentin-Baxter, above n 41, at 248. 
93  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, above n 22.  
94  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, above n 15, at 3. 
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withdrawal of the official members in the Legislative Assembly (1964), the establishment of a 
Cabinet (1964), the appointment of the Resident Commissioner as constitutional Head of State 
(1965), the establishment of an Executive Council (1965) and a final increase in legislative powers 
(1965).  
By choosing to base the CILA constitutional deliberations on this timetable, the issues discussed 
ultimately revolved around these proposals.95 The proposals were only intended to guide discussion, 
but given that the advisers only had five days to discuss the constitution with the CILA, there was 
not sufficient time to fully explore alternatives. In addition, the advisers tended to lead the 
discussions. For each step, they described the proposal, the possible alternatives and often, at this 
point, their own view on the matter.  The advisers undoubtedly sought to advance the Cook 
Islanders' interests by offering their considered opinion. However, in addition to the (somewhat 
unavoidable) limitations stemming from an adviser's background,96 their lack of interaction with the 
local people significantly limited the degree to which their advice can be seen as responsive to the 
political will of the people. 
Throughout the constitution-making process, there was little opportunity for the people of the 
Cook Islands to be directly involved. The geography of the Cook Islands made this a particular 
challenge – the distance between the 15 islands is immense and transport at the time was infrequent. 
Being aware of these constraints, efforts were made by the Cook Islands Government to ensure that 
the Islanders were informed of the constitutional developments. The discussions in the CILA were 
recorded and subsequently broadcast on the radio and reported in considerable detail in the Cook 
Islands News.97 The problem however lay in the lack of opportunity for the people to communicate 
their views back to the constitution-making body. As conceded by the Resident Commissioner at the 
time, at no point were the villagers invited to make submissions on the advisers' report or any later 
draft constitution.98 The proposed Constitution was considered by a Select Committee in Wellington 
(at which no interpreters were present).99 Further, though a delegation of CILA Members travelled 
  
95  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Minutes from the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (23 August 1963). 
96  As explained by Alison Quentin-Baxter, "a constitutional adviser's proposals are likely to be circumscribed 
by his or her own background, knowledge and personal philosophy": see Quentin-Baxter, above n 41, at 
273.  
97  Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 24, at 520. The report noted that as a result of the Government's 
efforts, "a significant section of the people throughout the Cook Islands became acquainted with the various 
problems under consideration". 
98  Mr Rata (Select Committee member): "There was no provision for the Assembly to hear opinions on that 
Report?" Mr Dare (Resident Commissioner): "We have never advertised that anybody could come along 
and make submissions to the Assembly or any special committee." See Island Territories Committee, above 
n 27, at 89.  
99  David Stone "Self-Determination in the Cook Islands: A Reply" (1965) 74(3) Journal of the Polynesian 
Society 360 at 364. 
598 (2014) 45 VUWLR 
to attend the Committee hearing, the advisers answered many of the questions put to the delegates 
because of their "technical" nature.100   
Finally, despite the New Zealand Government having indicated in 1962 that once a plan for self-
government had been prepared, "a plebiscite would be arranged to see if the plan was acceptable to 
the people as a whole",101 the Constitution was never subject to a popular referendum. When asked 
about this in the New Zealand Parliament, the Prime Minister explained that, while the Government 
had no objection to a referendum, the people of the Cook Islands had not requested one.102 The 
problem with this approach is that there was not much opportunity for the people to ask.  
To satisfy the UN requirement that associated status was "the result of a free and voluntary 
choice",103 a general election was arranged to be held before the Constitution came into force in 
place of a referendum. 104 The idea was that, as the Constitution was to be a central election issue, 
electors would have the chance to vote for candidates according to whether they supported the 
Constitution or not. Whether the election can be said to have had an effect similar to that of a 
referendum is however far from clear. The candidates who campaigned in support of a different 
variation of the proposed Constitution were defeated, but this was only seven out of the 66.105 
Furthermore, being a general election, the Constitution was not the only issue informing voters' 
choices.106 
It is clear from the minutes of CILA's constitutional deliberations that certain fundamental 
political decisions were made by its Members. That the Cook Islands was to operate as a democracy 
  
100  This prompted Sir Leslie Munro (member of the Select Committee) to ask about the meaning in the 
constitution's clause referring to the making of laws having extra-territorial operation. Professor Aikman 
(adviser) replied, "With respect, I wonder whether that is a fair question. I doubt if many members of this 
committee really understand what is meant by this highly technical question of extra-territorial jurisdiction." 
To this, Sir Leslie Munro explained: "I asked it as a very general question because I want to know whether 
these good and important people have an idea of what the Constitution Bill really means. I know perfectly 
well that Mr Dare, Professor Aikman and Mr Wright can explain this Bill." Island Territories Committee, 
above n 27, at 17. 
101  Gotz, above n 13, at 106. 
102  (21 October 1964) 340 NZPD 2836. 
103  Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, above n 12, Annex, Principle VII(a). 
104  Island Territories Committee, above n 27, at 92–93. See also David J Stone "Self-Rule in the Cook Islands: 
The Government and Politics of a New Micro-State" (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1971). 
105  Stone, above n 99, at 368. 
106  The UN subcommittee was, however, of the opinion that the general election (to be observed by the UN) 
and the subsequent decision in the CILA, would constitute an "identifiable act of self-determination". 
United Nations Report of Sub-Committee II of the Special Committee of 24 (1964) at 9. 
 EXAMINING NEW ZEALAND'S ROLE IN THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING EPISODES OF THE COOK ISLANDS AND NIUE 599 
with the Queen as the Head of State was firmly supported in the discussions.107  Other decisions on 
proposals that the CILA were less familiar with, however, can be less clearly attributed to the 
Members owing to the advisers' approach. In discussions relating to the functioning of Cabinet 
government, what the advisers expressed "was the best way", or the option "they ought to take", 
were eventually agreed upon by the members.108  
Further, it is evident that the initial decision to become a self-governing state in free association 
with New Zealand was clearly not fully determined by the CILA. When the CILA was first 
presented with four options for constitutional change in 1962, the decision to become self-governing 
in free association with New Zealand was swiftly made by the Members of the Assembly, without 
consulting their constituents.109 The CILA was fully elected, and on that basis the people could be 
seen as having made this decision indirectly. As became subsequently apparent however, the 
Members themselves did not fully understand what they were voting in favour of. When the 
advisers arrived at the CILA the following year, one member sought clarification as to what internal 
self-government actually meant. Joining in on this question, another member noted: "It is true the 
people do not truly understand the four doors [options] – there is a need for explanation."110  
The procedural and substantive constraints on the constitutional deliberations in the Cook 
Islands, coupled with the lack of public participation at every stage of the process, resulted in 
fundamental political decisions being overly influenced by New Zealand officials and advisers. As a 
result, New Zealand can be seen as having exercised a degree of constituent power in the Cook 
Islands at the expense of the people. 
Before concluding on the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes in the 
Cook Islands, it is necessary to consider its constitutional experience following the creation of the 
Constitution. Before the Constitution even entered into force, the CILA requested that the New 
Zealand Parliament make several amendments. The impetus for the hasty request was that the to-be 
Premier, Mr Albert Henry, was excluded from running for election due to the candidate rules. Along 
with amending the candidature rules, the amendment also provided for the creation of a consultative 
  
107  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Minutes from the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (29 August 1963). 
108  For example, the advisers recommended adopting the Cabinet system instead of the Committee system, 
having the Premier select Cabinet members instead of having a voting system, and having a smaller Cabinet 
(five members) instead of the preferred larger membership. In each instance, the CILA went on to agree 
with the advisers. Even in the instance that they did not (in relation to the number of Cabinet members), the 
advisers' view was that which was encapsulated in the report. See Cook Islands Legislative Assembly 
Minutes of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (19, 26 and 27 August 1963).  
109  Angus Ross (ed) New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (Longman Paul Ltd, 
Auckland, 1969) at 108.  
110  Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Report of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (23 August 1963) per 
Hon T Roi.  
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body of traditional leaders – the "House of Arikis", which had been largely excluded from the initial 
Constitution.111   
Since the passing into force of the Cook Islands Constitution, it has been amended 30 times, and 
"now differs markedly from the version enacted in 1965."112 To amend a provision of the 
Constitution, the amendment must receive support from two-thirds of the total membership of the 
CILA in two votes taken at least ninety days apart.113 For those provisions that are considered the 
"core" provisions of the Constitution,114 the amendment must also be submitted to a poll and 
supported by no less than two-thirds of the voting population.115  
Amendments to the Cook Islands Constitution have included those to remove the power of the 
New Zealand Parliament to make laws for the Cook Islands altogether,116 to patriate the court 
system,117 to provide for a bill of rights,118 and to give recognition to custom.119 Several of these 
amendments were passed explicitly to convince the international community that the Cook Islands 
was a state at international law;120 to remove what the Minister of Justice at the time described as 
perceived "vestiges of the Colonial System".121 The result has been a Constitution with a real 
"separate identity".122 On this basis, it must be concluded that at least some of the "lost" constituent 
power has been regained as the people have reasserted their constituent power. 
B Niue 
Niue's constitutional experience is a "rags to riches" tale – starting out poorly, it eventually 
proved to be an enriching experience for the Niuean people.  
  
111  Constitution of the Cook Islands, art 8. 
112  Laws of New Zealand "Pacific States and Territories: Cook Islands" (online ed) at [8].  
113  Article 41(1). 
114  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, ss 2–6 and arts 2 and 41 of the Constitution. 
115  Article 41(2). 
116  Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment) Act 1980, s 5. 
117  Section 7.  
118  Section 8. 
119  Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994, s 7. 
120  Laws of New Zealand, above n 112, at [15]. 
121  Press statement made by the Cook Islands Minister of Justice at the time of introduction of the Cook Islands 
Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1980. As quoted in CC Aikman "Constitutional Developments in the Cook 
Islands" in Peter Sack (ed) Pacific Constitutions (ANU Printing, Canberra, 1982) 87 at 89. 
122  Aikman, above n 121, at 89.  
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At the outset, New Zealand has been accused of "resort[ing] to an approach which strongly 
implied desperation in dealing with the Niue situation".123 As was the case in the Cook Islands, 
New Zealand wanted Niue to rapidly shift from a colony to a fully self-governing state. Niue 
however did not desire any such rapid change. By initially overlooking the concerns of the Niuean 
people, New Zealand risked making decisions on Niue's behalf and displacing the people's 
constituent power.  
Before New Zealand presented the CILA and the NIA with four options for constitutional 
change, the New Zealand Cabinet had already approved a timetable towards self-government.124 
"Whether the Cook Islands and Niue Assemblies were implicitly aware that these four alternatives 
did not offer any real choice did not seem to concern New Zealand", explains Chapman.125 New 
Zealand's unilateral approach to dealing with Niue, however, continued. In 1962, after the NIA had 
cautiously accepted self-government in principle, New Zealand proceeded to present a timetable for 
Niue's shift to self-government to the UN, before having discussed any such timetable with the NIA.  
Behind New Zealand's hasty approach was clear pressure from the UN which was committed to 
"bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations".126 
Though purporting to champion the Niuean people's rights, the people of Niue did not appreciate the 
UN's doctrinaire approach. They felt like the UN, an organisation of which they knew little, was 
forcing Niue apart from New Zealand and trying to push them into making a decision that vitally 
concerned them. One member of the public said:127 
We have been told some time ago that self-government was first suggested by New Zealand in 
connection with the wish of the United Nations. It is the wish of New Zealand or the United Nations, but 
they do not know much about Niue, what Niue can produce, how well off Niue is or how badly off 
financially. 
Despite the pressure placed on Niue to decolonise, the NIA refused to be rushed into self-
government. Owing to its fear of change, Niue resisted the pressure from New Zealand and in doing 
so took its constitutional development into its own hands. After consulting the people,128 the NIA 
  
123  Chapman, above n 10, at 17. 
124  Confidential Telegram No 276 from Mr McEwan (20 June 1962). Confirmed in a letter to McEwen 
(Resident Commissioner of Niue) regarding the "Future Policy in New Zealand's Island Territories" (22 
June 1962). 
125  Chapman, above n 10, at 12. 
126  Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, above n 7. 
127  Niue Island Legislative Assembly Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly (21 January 1965) 
(with Aikman and McEwen) at 5. 
128  Niue Island Legislative Assembly Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly (13–14 August 1963). 
The Ministers' reports to the NIA were that the people's views on self-government were very mixed. 
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rejected the timetable offered by New Zealand (that would have seen it attain self-government by 
1966), and instead passed a resolution stating that the "people should be asked by secret ballot" to 
determine the pace of constitutional developments.129 The NIA then went on to inform advisers 
twice that Niue was not ready for constitutional change. Eventually, Niue took responsibility for 
creating its own timetable – informed by consultation with the local people – according to which it 
eventually attained self-government. Once the constitution was drafted, copies were sent to each 
household before the people were asked to vote on it in a UN observed referendum. As reported in 
the UN Report on the Referendum, "the Mission gained the impression that everything possible had 
been done to associate the people of Niue with the issues involved and with the provisions of the 
draft constitution".130  
Public participation did not render Niue immune from the influence of New Zealand officials 
and advisers, but the potentially undemocratic effect of that influence was significantly attenuated 
because of it. By seeking the people's opinion on constitutional change, there was an unspoken 
obligation on the New Zealand officials and advisers alike to listen to and be guided by those 
opinions. During his visits, Professor Quentin-Baxter met with members of the NIA, the Executive 
Committee, the Niue Development Board, representative groups from the Public Service, the 
Resident Commissioner and locals through "well-attended village meetings in all parts of the 
island".131 His reports and subsequent constitutional recommendations were guided by this 
extensive consultation.132 As the NIA's adviser, he was clear that his "first responsibility is to ensure 
that every decision does reflect [the Niuean people's] will, arrived at without any outside constraint, 
and after they have understood the choices and implications".133 
New Zealand attempted to push Niue along and pre-empt decisions that ultimately were Niue's 
to make. Assisted by its adviser however, Niue managed to resist that pressure to a considerable 
extent and avoid an otherwise likely external exercise of constituent power. As it turned out, it was 
Niue that retained primary control over its fundamental political decisions. As in the Cook Islands, 
the people were always clear that it would function as a democracy with the Queen in Right of New 
Zealand as its Head of State. Unlike in the Cook Islands however, the decision to become self-
  
129  Niue Island Legislative Assembly Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly (9 October 1963). 
130  Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue A/9623/Add 
5 (Part V) Chap XXII (1974) at 25[81]. 
131  At 5[2]. 
132  For example, responding to the persistent concerns expressed to him by the people regarding Niue's 
economic future, Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended the inclusion of a section in the Niue Constitution 
Act that New Zealand would continue to provide "necessary economic and administrative assistance to 
Niue" (s 7 of the Niue Constitution Act 1974). 
133  RQ Quentin-Baxter, Telegram (20 June 1974) from Geneva to Wellington, as quoted in Quentin-Baxter, 
above n 41, at 273.  
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governing was one made by the people of Niue, on their own terms, when they were ready. As Hon 
R Rex made clear to the UN Visiting Mission: "it is self-government we want, we will decide when 
that will be – not when mother New Zealand says and certainly not when the United Nations 
says".134  
It could be said that there is intrinsic value in encouraging a country to decolonise and take 
control of its own affairs. Indeed, under certain conditions such encouragement could be seen as 
enhancing the people's constituent power by offering them a broader range of constitutional options. 
New Zealand's approach however, at least at the outset, was informed by its own interests to get 
itself off "the colonial hook" and cannot be said to have had this effect. The pressure felt by the 
Niuean people is clear in Professor Quentin-Baxter's first report. Explaining why many Niuean 
people were concerned about constitutional change, he noted that there:135  
… lay a fear that the fixed timetable for constitutional development had never really been withdrawn. It 
had, they felt, continued to tick away while the people were wrapped in a sense of false security – until 
now they found themselves unwillingly on the very brink of self-determination. 
Allowing the status quo to continue while expecting that the desired constitutional change will 
inevitably occur does not amount to enhancing the Niuean people's constitutional options – it rather 
limits them.   While New Zealand's influence in the constitution-making process in Niue therefore 
may not have amounted to an exercise of constituent power, it did not have the positive effect of 
enhancing a popular exercise. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that Niue's Constitution has only ever been amended once.136 
The Constitution's stringent amendment procedure is undoubtedly responsible for its lack of 
amendments. Every proposed amendment, along with attaining the requisite parliamentary 
majority,137 must be submitted to a popular referendum. For most amendments a simple majority 
will suffice. For certain provisions however, including those relating to Niue's political relationship 
with New Zealand,138 a super majority of two thirds support for the amendment is required. This 
  
134  Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Niue, 1972 A/AC 109/L 810/Rev 1, Annex 2 (Statement by 
Leader of Government, 21 June 1972). 
135  Quentin-Baxter, above n 39, at 6[8]. 
136  Niue Constitution Amendment Act 1992. This was an omnibus bill comprising three amendments for which 
voters could vote in favour of all or none. Amendments included those to patriate the court system and make 
the specialist Lands Courts a division of the High Court (s 4), change the qualifications for electors and 
candidates (s 2), and repeal the special provisions for proposed legislation relating to criminal law or status 
of persons (s 3). 
137  The proposed amendment must have the support of two thirds of the NIA members evidenced in two votes 
taken at least 13 weeks apart. Niue Constitution Act 1974, art 35. 
138  Sections 2–9, and arts 1 and 69. 
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rigorous amendment process has been credited with contributing to the Constitution's stability, but it 
raises real concerns that the people's constituent power is being constrained. To be clear, it was at 
the insistence of the local people that there be significant barriers in place to prevent certain 
provisions of the Constitution being changed. The people did not want the Constitution, and in 
particular those provisions relating to Niue's on-going relationship with New Zealand, to be subject 
to the whim of politicians.139 There is no denying, however, that the amendment procedures of the 
Niue Constitution pose a significant barrier to present expressions of popular constituent power.  
VI A BETTER APPROACH: A TWO-STAGE MODEL 
A Background 
Constitution-making ought to be a national exercise – one in which the people come together 
and map out their future political order. For a range of reasons however,140 an external state will 
often play a key role in the future political order of small, dependent non-self-governing island 
states. Any model for constitution-making for such island states would best recognise this fact and 
be modelled accordingly.  
This part will propose a model of constitution-making that expressly recognises a role for an 
external state (or several). It is designed with the remaining non-self-governing island states in 
mind: American Samoa, Guam, Pitcairn, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Tokelau in the 
Pacific, and Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, US Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
Montserrat, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Turks and Caicos Islands and St Helena in the Caribbean 
and Atlantic. The model would apply in the instance that these island states sought to shift towards a 
formal self-governing status of some description as was the case in the Cook Islands and Niue.141 
The model proceeds on the view, as defended in the previous parts of this article, that it is possible 
to have an exercise of popular constituent power while involving an external state in the 
constitution-making process. The key object of the proposed model is to provide an avenue for the 
external state to participate in or contribute to the process while ensuring that this does not impinge 
  
139  Quentin-Baxter, above n 40, at 583. 
140  There are several reasons why a non-self-governing territory would choose some form of associated 
statehood over full independence. An associated political status normally entails significant administrative 
and economic benefits, social welfare assistance, higher quality health and education assistance, natural 
disaster relief, and the provision of costly external defence. Further, there are significant employment and 
material benefits that come with retaining shared citizenship. Overall, the empirical data has shown that 
island states that are not fully independent enjoy a higher living standard than independent island states. See 
generally G Bertram "On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with their Metropolitan Powers" 
(2004) 32 World Development 343 at 353; and Baldacchino, above n 4, at 193. 
141  While the non-self-governing island states share characteristics, the particular features of each island state 
would need to be carefully considered. 
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on the people's exercise of constituent power. It is ultimately aimed at enhancing the democratic 
legitimacy of external influence in constitution-making.    
The constitutional experience of Tokelau, New Zealand's last remaining dependent territory,142 
provides in part the inspiration for the proposed model, and therefore will be discussed in brief.  
In 2006 and 2007, the people of Tokelau were asked to vote in referenda to determine whether 
Tokelau would become self-governing in free association with New Zealand. Though the requisite 
proportion of votes to decolonise was not met, the pre-referendum processes offer insight into a 
unique approach to constitution-making for small dependent island states seeking to decolonise.  
The referenda to decide on the future status of Tokelau proceeded on the basis of two 
documents: the draft Treaty of Free Association and the draft Constitution. These documents were 
to provide the legal framework for Tokelau if it were to become self-governing. The documents 
were related but designed to serve two distinct purposes: the draft Treaty outlined the terms of the 
relationship of free association between the two states, while the draft Constitution set the rules for 
Tokelau's self-government. In light of the distinct functions, the documents were the products of 
distinct processes: the Treaty was a "collaborative effort between Tokelau and New Zealand", while 
the draft Constitution was a "Tokelauan effort throughout".143  
The initiative to record Tokelau's prospective relationship with New Zealand in a treaty was 
proposed by the constitutional adviser, Professor Tony Angelo. The people of Tokelau were 
concerned that economic and administrative support from New Zealand would decrease if self-
government was attained, as had been observed in the Cook Islands and Niue. It was considered 
that, by binding the parties at the international level, stronger protection would be afforded to the 
relationship while also placing the parties on an equal footing in the instance that obligations were 
breached or sought to be modified.144 
For Tokelau, the result of the pre-referendum effort was a fully autochthonous draft 
Constitution.145 Its substance was an articulation of a political order that had emerged, for the most 
  
142  The Tokelau Act 1948 established Tokelau as "part of New Zealand". Having rejected self-government, 
Tokelau remains a dependent territory of New Zealand. It is still on the UN list of non-self-governing 
territories. See Andrew Townend "Tokelau's 2006 Referendum on Self-Government" (2007) 5 NZJPIL 127; 
and AH Angelo "The Constitution of Tokelau" (2009) 15 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 181. 
143  Townend, above n 142, at 144. 
144  Compare this position with that of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand can alter the terms of the 
relationship by amending the relevant Acts by a simple majority in the New Zealand Parliament. The Cook 
Islands and Niue can only change the terms of the relationship according to the amendment provisions in the 
respective Constitutions – which, for Niue especially, presents a significant hurdle. 
145  Had the referenda been successful, the draft Constitution would have become the supreme law of Tokelau. 
As this did not happen, it remains in place as a consolidation of key constitutional rules already in force. See 
Angelo, above n 142, at 182. 
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part, internally, and reflected a "coral-up" approach. To come into force, the Constitution was "to 
spring forth", not by a positive act by the New Zealand Parliament, but by its withdrawal.146 At the 
same time, by virtue of the draft Treaty, Tokelau was to maintain its New Zealand citizenship and 
was assured ongoing economic and administrative support "to maintain and improve the quality of 
life of the people of Tokelau".147  
Looking back at the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue, it is clear that there 
were problems stemming from tying the decision regarding the states' political status (and hence the 
future relationship with New Zealand) with the constitution-making process.148 The uncertainty 
regarding New Zealand's intentions throughout consistently overshadowed the constitutional 
deliberations, diverting attention away from matters of constitutional design.149 Further, by not 
clearly delineating at what stage New Zealand's involvement was appropriate, its influence 
permeated the entirety of the constitution-making process. In both cases, New Zealand's role failed 
to enhance the constituent power of the people, and in the case of the Cook Islands, it ultimately led 
to an external exercise of constituent power. 
The approach taken in Tokelau largely avoided the issues faced in the Cook Islands and Niue by 
procedurally separating out the processes pertaining to the state's future political status and 
constitution. Building on Tokelau's experience, the proposed model therefore consists of two stages. 
To reduce the risk of undemocratic external influence in the constitution-making process to the 
greatest extent possible, the model will further propose temporally separating the processes 
regarding a non-self-governing state's political status and constitutional regime, with a recognised 
interim period in between.150  
  
146  Townend, above n 142, at 149. 
147  Draft Treaty of Free Association between New Zealand and Tokelau, art 4. 
148  Interestingly, there is an implicit distinction between the two stages in the Constitutions. As explained by 
Professor Angelo, "[t]he physical and terminological distinction in the Constitution of Niue between its 
sections and its articles … reflects two sides of the coin: the relationship of free association with New 
Zealand and the self-governing state." AH Angelo "The Niue Constitution" (2009) 15 Revue Juridique 
Polynésienne 157 at 159. 
149  This was picked up by Sir Leslie Munro during the Select Committee. He noted: "When I was there about 
three months ago I do not think anybody approached me and spoke to me about this constitution. All I had 
were questions as to whether the people would have the right to come to New Zealand whenever they liked. 
Do you agree that this is a pretty common approach?" Mr Dare (Resident Commissioner): "Yes, I think so." 
See Island Territories Committee, above n 27, at 82. 
150  This model draws on Arato's two-stage "democratic constitution-making" model, but departs from it in 
several key ways. Arato perceives two instances that play a fundamental role in the drafting process: an 
"instance that drafts the interim constitution, typically a round table of major political forces, and an 
instance that drafts the final document, always a freely elected body…". The former instance creates 
constitution-making rules that are binding on the latter. For post-conflict states, this process provides 
promise, but it is rejected for application in the context of small dependent states. Procedurally, it is over 
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B The Proposed Model 
The first stage of the proposed model would centre on determining the future political status of 
the non-self-governing state. As any proposed change in the state's political status would likely 
involve ongoing relations with an external state (for example, in the form of a relationship of free 
association), the external state would enjoy a recognised role at this stage. Representatives of both 
states would convene to negotiate the terms of the states' future relationship and the ongoing 
obligations on each. Though this stage may take the form of negotiations between political powers, 
there is nothing preventing a high level of public consultation throughout. Some aspects of the 
negotiations may indeed have to be closed,151 but to ensure that the respective parties are fully 
aware of the relevant considerations and interests at stake, the public should be informed of the 
issues and given a forum through which to communicate their views.  
Once the parties have agreed on the nature and form of the states' future relationship, the 
outcome of the negotiations would be encapsulated in a treaty.152 As proposed by Alison Quentin-
Baxter in her "sustained autonomy" model, the international community would thereby become "the 
guarantor of the continuation of the necessary support for small autonomous islands".153 It would be 
on the basis of this treaty that the people would vote in a referendum to determine their future 
political status. If rejected, no change would occur – the status quo would continue.154 If the 
proposed change is accepted, however, the treaty would subsequently be signed by the respective 
parties and enter into force. Regardless of what they choose, the people in the island-state would 
retain the power to change their political status at any point in the future.155 
  
complicated for such small jurisdictions, and substantively, it clashes with the position defended in this 
article that constituent power should not be limited or constrained. The general thrust of Arato's recognition 
of "the importance of state building in the first stage and regime creation dominating in the second stage" is 
picked up in the proposed model. See Andrew Arato "Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign 
Constitution-making" (2009) 22 Int J Polit Cult Soc 427.  
151  As is the case with constitution-making. See Elster, above n 59, at 388. 
152  Alison Quentin-Baxter "Sustained Autonomy: An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands" (1994) 24 
VUWLR 1 at 17. In her model, the external state would enter into a treaty with an international 
organisation, though it seems more appropriate that the primary state itself be a party to the treaty as was to 
be the case in Tokelau. 
153 At 17. 
154  For an argument in favour of the UN General Assembly recognising the status quo see Elisabeth Perham "A 
Solution for the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: A 'Fourth' Option to Obviate 
the Need for a Fourth Decade?" (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013) at 32. 
155  This is required under the General Assembly Resolution 1541, Principle VII(a). See Principles which 
should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called 
for under Article 73e of the Charter, above n 12. 
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A successful referendum, in which the requisite proportion of people voted in favour of the 
proposed new political status, would constitute an internationally recognised act of self-
determination. The former territory's status, under which its international personality was severely 
limited,156 would come to an end. This is made clear in Resolution 2625 of the General Assembly, 
which states:157  
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has under the Charter, a status separate 
and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under 
the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised 
their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and 
principles. 
By exercising its right to self-determination in a fair and free referendum, the newly self-
governing state would attain the capacity to enter into treaties, such as that between it and the 
external state. Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that "every State" 
has the capacity to conclude treaties.158 The international statehood of associated states has not 
always been recognised. When the Cook Islands and Niue became self-governing, it was not 
considered possible for them to enter into international treaties. As evidenced by the range of 
multilateral and bilateral treaties that the Cook Islands and Niue have entered into since 
decolonisation,159 it is clear that it is now possible for associated states to be recognised as "states" 
  
156  For example, although Tokelau is substantially self-governing in practice, as a dependent territory of New 
Zealand, it does not have a separate international legal personality. For the most part, the New Zealand 
Government undertakes any treaty-making in respect of Tokelau on the basis of consultation with the 
Government of Tokelau. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs "International Treaty Making: Guidance for 
government agencies on practice and procedures for concluding international treaties and arrangements" 
(September 2012) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz>. For comments of the Special Rapporteur on the treaty-
making capacity of protectorates and other dependent States, see generally Sir Humphrey Waldock "First 
Report on the Law of Treaties" in Yearbook of the International Law Commission [1962] vol 2 YILC at 37. 
157  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625, XXV A/RES/2625 (1970) 
(emphasis added). 
158  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (23 May 1969). The Convention does not 
define the term "State", but commentary of the International Law Commission on the draft article that 
became art 6 explains that "[t]he term "State" … means a State for the purposes of international law": 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission [1966] vol 2 YILC at 192. See generally Daniel Turp and 
François Roch "Article 6: Capacity of States to Conclude Treaties" in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) 
The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 
107. 
159  This path was forged by the Cook Islands. After the World Health Organisation accepted the Cook Islands' 
membership application in 1984, and its subsequent admittance to the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
of the United Nations (1985), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1985) and 
International Civil Aviation Organization (1986), the Secretary-General recognised it as a full member 
without any specifications or limitations in 1992 with full treaty-making capacity. The full treaty-making 
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for the purpose of international law.160 Furthermore, "there is a clear tendency", explains Igarashi, 
"to recognize the international personality of Associated States as much as possible, once the right 
of self-determination has been established".161 
If the island-state chooses to become self-governing, it would proceed to the second stage of the 
model to define a new constitutional regime.  Unlike the first stage, this process would be the sole 
domain of the newly self-governing state (or more precisely, its constituent or legislative assembly). 
There would be no established role for the external state in the deliberations for a new constitution 
(though external advice or funding voluntarily sought may be appropriate where this contributes to 
the people's constituent power). Following a participative and open constitution-making process, the 
people would be invited to vote on the proposed constitution in a second referendum. If affirmed, 
the proposed constitution would become supreme law by an action of the newly self-governing 
state's legislative assembly.   
The question remaining regarding this proposed model is: if a state accepts a change in political 
status, in what form and under what authority does the political regime operate in the interim before 
a new constitution passes into force? In order to keep the process as simple as possible, it is 
desirable that the state's former governance structures continue to operate as per normal. For most 
former territories this would pose no problem as they function at the day-to-day level as self-
governing states already. Where this is not the case, a basic interim constitution may need to be 
considered.162  
In relation to constitution-making in small dependent states, several benefits flow from 
separating the decision regarding the political relationship with the external state from the 
  
capacity of Niue was recognised by the Secretary-General in 1994.  See Summary of Practice of the 
Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral treaties UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev 1 (1994) at [82]–[87]. The 
treaty-making capacity of the Cook Islands was made further clear in the Joint Declaration between the 
Cook Islands and New Zealand, which stipulates that "[t]he Government of the Cook Islands possesses the 
capacity to enter into treaties and other international agreements in its own right with governments and 
regional and international organisations." Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship 
between New Zealand and the Cook Islands (Rarotonga, 11 June 2001) at cl 5. See generally Laws of New 
Zealand, above n 112, at [34]. 
160  The focus is on the competence of the particular associated State. Alison Quentin-Baxter explains: "the test 
is whether the associated State is competent to exercise, and does in fact exercise, responsibility for the 
conduct of its external relations in its own right and not as an organ of its partner State". See Laws of New 
Zealand, above n 112, at [34]. 
161  Masahiro Igarashi Associated Statehood in International Law (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 
2002) at 300. 
162  Interim Constitutions have been widely used, particularly in post-conflict situations, for example in South 
Africa (1993), Nepal (2007) and Iraq (2004). See generally Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and 
Anthony Regan Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process (Interpeace, Switzerland, 2011) 
at [2.1.9]. 
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constitutional deliberations. For an external (former colonising) state, this model offers a means to 
engage in the decolonisation process so to discharge its "obligation to promote to the utmost … 
well-being of the inhabitants of these territories",163 while ensuring that such involvement does not 
detract from the democratic legitimacy of the process overall. It also ensures that Principle VII(b) of 
General Assembly Resolution 1541, which  states that an "associated territory should have the right 
to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due 
constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people", is afforded respect.164 
For the island-state, by clearly delineating the stage at which the external state has a role, its 
influence can be contained and channelled so as to avoid a potential external exercise of constituent 
power. By determining the political status and future relationship with the external state in stage 
one, the local people's attention can be wholly focussed on constitutional design in stage two. The 
risk that the people may feel pressured to acquiesce to the external state's suggestions, or are in 
some way beholden to it, is significantly reduced. Having already determined the nature of the 
future relationship between the island-state and external state, decisions can be taken by the people 
without fear that those decisions may reduce their chances to continue receiving support from the 
external state.  
For both states, providing a democratically legitimate avenue for the external state to be 
involved in the constitution-making process of the island-state ultimately fosters an enhancement of 
the latter's constituent power. For the most part, it is the non-self-governing state that wishes to 
maintain ongoing ties with an external state. To wholly exclude a role for an external state in the 
constitution-making process would therefore ultimately limit the options available for the non-self-
governing island-state. With this in mind, stage one provides a democratically legitimate means for 
an external state to be involved in the constitution-making process. To ensure, however, that the 
constitution is an expression of popular constituent power, stage two provides a temporally distinct 
process for constitutional design which is the sole domain of the people.  
VII CONCLUSION  
Reflecting on the persistence of colonialism in the Pacific, Alison Quentin-Baxter makes the 
following comment:165  
In very small islands that are still non-self-governing, the concern is not the continuation of colonial 
status. It is the possible ending of that status and with it the ending or substantial reduction of the 
administering power's present support. The real enemy is not present exploitation. It is future neglect. 
  
163  Charter of the United Nations, art 73.  
164  Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, above n 12. 
165  Quentin-Baxter, above n 152, at 3. 
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Classical constituent power theory demands that a constitution be the product of a popular 
exercise of constituent power; an act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the people. 
It has been argued that the existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is not 
necessarily at odds with this. This article has rejected generalised verdicts regarding external 
influence and advocated in favour of particularised assessment that takes as its focus the effect of 
external influence on the exercise of constituent power. The democratic legitimacy of the 
constitution-making process is dependent on the constitution being a manifestation of the people's 
constituent power. In so far as external actors do not displace the people's constituent power but 
rather enhance it, there is no reason to exclude such influence; there may even be reason to 
encourage it.  
The Cook Islands and Niue, like many former non-self-governing territories, did not desire full 
independence at decolonisation. By seeking a relationship of free association with New Zealand that 
included shared citizenship and financial assistance, a role for New Zealand was expected and 
largely welcome throughout the respective island states' constitution-making processes. In neither 
instance, however, did New Zealand's role in the respective constitution-making processes enhance 
the people's constituent power, and in the case of the Cook Islands, New Zealand exercised a degree 
of constituent power. 
New Zealand's more recent decolonising experience with Tokelau points towards a more 
promising approach to constitution-making in non-self-governing island states. Tokelau ultimately 
chose not to become an associated state. By drawing on its experience however, this article has 
advanced a two-stage model for constitution-making designed with the remaining 15 non-self-
governing island states in mind. As ongoing political ties with an external state are often sought at 
decolonisation by such island states, the aim of the model is to provide an avenue for that external 
state to participate in or contribute to the constitution-making process while maintaining the 
process's democratic legitimacy. 
The remaining non-self-governing communities of the 21st century continue to respond to their 
political and social realities as best they can, with an aim of ensuring the brightest possible future 
for their future generations. For some, this has meant retaining colonial ties with an external actor. 
This article has not attempted to propose a model relationship of political association for such small 
dependent island states, but it has presented a model for constitution-making in the instance that 
they wish to go down that path.166 
Listen and observe, assist when asked, find and smooth the way forward to a viable self-governing 
future for the territory – that is the role for those outside. The advisors will not live in the decolonised 
  
166  AH Angelo "Statement by the Constitutional Adviser to the United Nations Committee of 24" (Pacific 
Regional Seminar, Nadi, 14–16 May 2002) in AH Angelo and A Townend Tokelau: A Collection of 
Documents and References Relating to Constitutional Development (4th ed, Law Publications, Wellington, 
2003) at 193. 
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territory, the United Nations Committee of 24 will not live there, the colonial governors or 
administrators will not live there – but, if Tokelau is the example, Tokelauans will.  
 
